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Abstract—Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) use computational
resources to control physical process and provide critical
services. For this reason, an attack in these systems may have
dangerous consequences in the physical world. Hence, resilience
is a fundamental property to ensure the safety of the people,
the environment and the controlled physical process. In this
paper, we present metrics to quantify the resilience level based
on the design, structure, stability, and performance under the
attack of a given CPS. The metrics provide reference points to
evaluate whether the system is better prepared or not to face
the adversaries. This way, it is possible to quantify the ability to
recover from an adversary using its mathematical model based
on switched linear systems and actuators saturation. Finally,
we validate our approach using a numeric simulation on the
Tennesse Eastman control challenge problem.
Keywords: Cyber-Physical Security, Critical Infrastructures,
Resilience, Metrics, Adversary Model, Switched Linear Systems,
Actuator Saturation, Networked Control Systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stability refers to the ability of a system to return to the
equilibrium point after system disturbances, for example, due
to malicious actions that move the system from stable states
to unstable ones. Performance aims at working at the desired
dynamic response and in a control mode that optimizes the ob-
jective function that minimizes costs and maximizes revenues.
It must be noted that performance is often calculated after the
adversary actions since it is difficult to know in advance how
the system will react to an unknown adversary.
Stability and performance are important factors to accept
or reject a system design. The control theory community has
provided different criteria to analyze them, such as Lyapunov
theory, root-locus, Routh-Hurwitz, Bode or Nyquist methods.
These mechanisms are prepared to take into account failure or
process errors. However, they are not prepared for malicious
actions that may perturb the system.
Historically, malicious actions have not been a system
concern since this problem appeared with the introduction of
computing resources to control the physical processes. In this
context, it is necessary to have mechanisms to provide cyber
resilience that goes beyond the traditional failure resilience and
it can deal with and correct malicious actions. In addition, it is
also necessary to have mechanisms to evaluate at design time
the resilience of a CPS from a cyber point of view in order to
determine its capability to face cyber-physical adversaries.
It is not easy to predict at design time if the system will
be stable when facing unknown malicious actions that will
be introduced at runtime. However, it is possible to provide
reference points to evaluate whether the system is better
prepared or not to face the adversaries.
This paper aims at providing a set of metrics that measure at
design time the system behavior to determine whether or not it
will be acceptable during an attack. We consider both issues:
performance and stability. To do so, it may be acceptable to
work in a graceful degradation mode while facing an attack,
but it must be ensured at least the stability and a minimum
performance threshold. We also analyze the internal structure
of the system, identifying the critical components that are
required to keeps providing its fundamental functions and the
capability of the system to restore the crucial components in
case of damage due to attacks.
Consequently, the main contributions of this paper can
be summarized as follows: (1) we provide a mechanism
to evaluate at design time the resilience of a CPS in the
presence of cyber-physical adversaries considering both the
performance and stability of the system, and the design and its
structure; (3) we sum up guidelines to improve the resilience
by design of a CPS; and (4) we provide experimental work to
validate the approach.
Paper Organization — Section II provides the related work.
Section III provides preliminaries and assumptions about the
system and the adversary. Section IV presents our resilience
metrics to evaluate it. Section V reports the experimental work
and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Resilience is an important system’s property that has been
analyzed in different disciplines and contexts in the last years.
In this section, we analyze different evaluation mechanisms
from a cyber and cyber-physical point of view.
In order to achieve resilient systems, it is important to
develop appropriate metrics to assess it and demonstrate the
utility of the proposed approaches. Different research works
have identified attributes to measure the resilience of a system.
In the sequel, we present the main findings.
In [8], authors propose a metric to evaluate the criticality
of a component in a network system from the perspective of
their contribution to resilience. Specifically, the two proposed
metrics quantify the priority with which a failed component
should be repaired and the potential loss in the optimal system
resilience due to a time delay in the recovery of a failed
component. In this paper, we analyze the resilience of the
system as a whole. The objective is to quantify whether a
proposed approach improves resilience or not.
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In [11], the authors proposed a resilience analysis frame-
work and a metric for measuring it. The framework is focused
on the achievement of three resilience capacities: adaptability,
absorbability, and recoverability. These properties are the basis
for the resilience metric. This approach presents a general
metric designed to apply to a wide variety of systems, such as
physical, economic, social, ecological, among other types of
systems. Due to its generality, this mechanism is not the most
suitable for evaluating the reaction of a CPS when facing an
attack, since it is not capable of considering all the specific
characteristics of this kind of system.
A metric is provided in [22] that describes resilience in four
dimensions on a policy level. However, it does not capture the
runtime performance of a system or the temporal component
of the resilience, which its an important factor to consider.
In [27] is presented a metric framework that integrates the
cognitive, cyber, and physical aspects considering time and
data integrity characteristics. The resilience is considered with
respect to control stability and the author uses control response
and stability as a performance measure. Similarly, [7] models
a system as a hierarchical set of controllers that are then
behavior bottom-up to retrieve system resilience. The proposed
approaches use traditional performance metrics to provide a
visualization methodology for operators and indications of
issues that show the impact of the disturbances. These metrics
are related to state awareness of the real-time operation, but
they do not allow to evaluate in advance the reaction of the
system. In addition, they consider physical threats and cyber
threats in a separate manner. Hence, it is not clear if the
approach will be able to handle cyber-physical adversaries
capable of making the system to lose the state monitoring
of the system.
In addition, the authors in [4] propose a resilience metric
for CPS modeled as linear systems with and without actuator
saturation. It considers both the physical and cyber aspects
of the systems. They quantify the ability of the system to
recover from an attack under the assumption that the attack
is discovered within a fixed time interval and evaluating its
domains of attraction. The proposed physical evaluation is
based on the stability evolution of the system. However, it is
a mathematical abstract definition that may be hard to apply
to practical evaluation.
In this paper, we provide a metric specific for CPS systems
that takes into account the temporal dimension of resilience.
It is based on the stability and performance of the physical
process in order to guarantee that the required safety properties
are met. The objective is to provide a mechanism to assess the
resilience of the system at the design time.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We provide in this section our assumptions about the system
and the adversary models as well as some initial preliminary
concepts.
A. System Model
A cyber-physical system can be mathematically modeled as
follows:
xk+1 = Axk +Bsat(uk) + wk (1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the vector of the state variables at the k-th
time step, uk ∈ Rp is the control signal, and wk ∈ Rn is
the process noise that is assumed to be a zero-mean Gaussian
white noise with covariance Q, i.e. wk ∼ N(0, Q). Moreover,
A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×p are respectively the state matrix
and the input matrix.
Actuator saturation is an inherent non-linearity feature in
dynamic systems caused by constraints that reflect bounds or
limits in actuators. The saturation function sat : R → R
is defined as follows: sat(ui) = sign(ui)min{|ui|, Smax}
where ui is one entry of the command input u that is calculated
as u = Kx with K the feedback gain matrix and Smax is the
maximum saturation level. For a vector u ∈ Rm we define
sat(u) as sat(u) = [sat(u1)sat(u2)...sat(um)].
The saturation limits the maximum command that may be
executed at every time step. Hence, it is important to consider
the actuator saturation for resilience because it limits the
impact of the adversary on the system [15], but it also limits
the response of the system to recover due to its implications
on the stability and reachability of control. Actuators can not
inject arbitrarily large amounts of energy into the system since
there are always physical limitations and the saturation arises
from these limits.
A static relation maps the state xk to the system output
yk ∈ Rm:
yk = Cxk + vk (2)
where C ∈ Rm×n is the output matrix. The value of the
output vector yk represents the measurement produced by the
sensors that are affected by a noise vk assumed as a zero-mean
Gaussian white noise and covariance R, i.e. vk ∼ N(0, R).
We assume a system that is stable and showed optimal con-
trol under normal conditions (i.e. in the absence of malicious
actions).
B. Adversary Model
The objective of the adversary is to cause a malfunction
in the system by performing actions that affect the control
system. The adversary is situated in a remote location but
gained access to the internal network exploiting some cyber
vulnerabilities and uses the network traffic to perform the
attack as an insider.
A cyber-physical adversary can be modeled mathematically
as follows
x′k+1 = Axk +B
′sat(u′k) + wk (3)
y′k = C
′xk + vk (4)
where B′sat(u′k) represents an attack to the control input.
The matrix B′ is estimated by the attacker for the system
model matrix B and u′k is a malicious command. C
′ represents
an attacker that is able to create a malicious sensor outputs
y′k. These malicious actions may be done by compromising
sensors, actuators, controllers or network links.
The adversary that corrupts the system measurements and
the command outputs simultaneously is the most powerful
adversary, which is the parametric cyber-physical adversary
described in [28]. The adversary has the ability to estimate
the system parameters, for example, with techniques such as
machine learning, ARX (Autoregressive with exogenous input)
or ARMAX (Autoregressive-moving average with exogenous
input) models.
In addition, this adversary can inject specific malicious
measurements designed to deceive the control system as in
Equation 4 using the matrix C ′ which is also an estimated of
the real system parameter. This means that the attacker will try
to send a sensor output according to the system state xk that
the controller is expecting. This attack is designed intentionally
to mislead the system or destabilize it without being detected.
In opposite to faults that have a random nature and are much
easier to be detected and mitigated. The closer the matrices B′
and C ′ are to the real matrices B and C, the more dangerous
is the adversary.
IV. RESILIENCE METRICS
This section presents the metrics to evaluate the system
resilience at design time.
A. Performance and Stability Analysis
This analysis determines whether the system will remain
stable and meet the minimum performance threshold under
attack. It allows quantifying the maximum time that the system
can resist in the absorb phase under attack, i.e., the maximum
time that it has to react and stop the malicious actions. It also
allows determining the states that the system may reach during
the malicious action and estimate the maximum performance
damage that the adversary may cause.
Traditionally, the performance is used to measure the devi-
ation between the process dynamics and the models to control
it. In addition, it can be used to evaluate the resilience of a
system by analyzing the capacity to absorb and recover from
malicious action. In this section, we evaluate the underlying
physical model to dimension the maximum performance loss
during the worst attack scenario.
Thresholds and Setpoints: The performance must be defined
according to the defined process operating objectives. For ex-
ample, some possible objectives are safety conditions, product
quality, environment protection, equipment protection, quality
control, profit, among others. These established objectives will
define process constraints that can be expressed as restrictions
over the state of the system and they can be controlled through
the monitored process variables. These restrictions define the
performance thresholds (TS) that must be satisfied even when
the system is working under attack. Hence, the first step is to
establish the minimum performance threshold that is required,
and the setpoint (SP ) for the normal system behavior.
In addition, the performance should be evaluated over a
period of time which we will divide in the absorb and recover
phase. The absorb phase starts with the attack in time k0 and
finishes in time ka when the system reaches its minimum
performance. The recovery phase starts in ka and finishes in
kr when the system recovers its normal performance in the
setpoint SP . This allows estimating the maximum derivation
during the attack to evaluate if the performance threshold
will be ensured. A small state variation during the attack
is desirable so that the process variable remains close to its
equilibrium state.
The resilience is based on the absorbing and recovering
potential. The absorbing property of a system is the degree
to which challenges can be handled even with performance
degradation. The recovery potential describes a system’s abil-
ity to restore normal operation in the face of challenges.
To estimate the performance, we will evaluate the system
evolution during the absorb and recover phases.
Absorb Phase Time: The absorb time (KA) corresponds to
the time required for the resilience approach to start working.
In particular, the system is defined as resilient if for any
adversarial input in the absorb phase the resulting state is
within the threshold range.
Recover Phase Time: The recovery time (KR) which corre-
sponds to the period kr − ka depends on how fast the system
can be stabilized. It can be estimated with the settling time
of the control system. The settling time is defined as the time
taken for the process response to settle within near a constant
value, usually in some band within 2% around the equilibrium
state [24].
Maximum Deviation: The maximum deviation (MD) of the
controlled variable from the SP is an important measure of
the process degradation. We assume that in normal behavior
the system is in the SP . Hence, the maximum deviation
MD corresponds to the difference between the SP and the
possibles deviations Ψ during the attack.
MD = max{|Ψ− SP |}
Given the time KA, calculated as in the previous section,
which is the maximum time the system can be in the absorb
phase, it is possible to calculate the states that can be reached
in the worst case scenario where the attacker takes the system
to its saturation level.
Hence, the maximum reachable state in time KA is calcu-
lated by substituting recursively the state xk in the period k0
and ka as follows
χ = xka = Ax(ka−1) ±BSmax
χ = AKASP ±
KA∑
i=1
A(KA−i)BSmax (5)
where χ indicates the maximum and minimum reachable states
using the saturation level Smax. The set Ψ can be determined
as Ψ = Cχ using Equation 2.
Resilience Loss: The resilience loss (RL) is the sum of the
differences between SP and the actual performance of the
monitored variables during the absorb and recovery phase, i.e.,
RL is the sum of areas above and below the setpoint.
RL = (
kr∑
j=k0
|yj − SP |) (6)
Performance and Stability Resilience: The Performance and
Stability Resilience PR can be estimated as the area defined
within the thresholds TS during the absorb and recovery phase
less the resilience loss RL.
PR = (NR−RL)/NR (7)
where NR = (TSsup − TSinf )× (KA+KR).
General Performance and Stability Evaluation: The perfor-
mance and stability resilience analysis quantifies the impact of
the attack in one of the monitored variables. For this reason,
it is desired to have an overall metric that contemplates the
global state of the system.
Not all the components contribute equally to develop the
system crucial functions. Hence, not all resources are equally
likely to be used by an attacker. The resource’s contribution
to a system’s attack surface depends on the resource’s damage
potential, i.e., the level of harm the attacker can cause to the
system in using this resource in an attack. The higher the
damage potential, the higher the contribution to the attack
surface.
In addition, the resilient must be evaluated considering the
process operation objectives. As we mentioned previously,
these objectives establishes the process constraints that create
state and monitored variables restrictions. For this reason, we
need to evaluate the resources that are part of the system’s
attack surface to determine whether they are critical from the
objectives point of view. Then, it is possible to define cATj
as the contribution of the monitored variable j to the attack
surface according to the defined objectives.
We calculate the global performance and stability resilience
(GR) index by pondering the performance and stability re-
silience PR evaluation of each measured variable j according
to their contribution to the attack surface as follows:
GR =
m∑
j=1
cATj ×min(PRj) (8)
B. Design and Structure Analysis
To create a resilient CPS, it is required to build a set of stable
models to activate when facing an attack. In this section, we
will review the techniques proposed in the literature to achieve
resilient designs and how to evaluate its structure according to
the adversaries the system can recover from.
The cyber-physical adversaries compromise the process by
affecting the ability to maintain situational awareness of the
process (i.e. affecting the observability) or by reducing the
ability to bring the process to the desired state (i.e. affecting
the controllability), or a combination of both.
Definition 1 (Controllability [16][17]): A system is con-
trollable if every state vector xk can be transformed into the
desired state in finite time by the application of control inputs
uk. The controllability depends only on matrices A and B
since a necessary and sufficient condition for a system to be
controllable is that the controllability matrix C(A,B) has n
linearly independent columns.
rank C(A,B) = rank[B|AB|...|An−1B] = n (9)
Definition 2 (Observability [16][17]): The system is observ-
able in n time-steps when the initial state x0 can be recov-
ered from a sequence of observations y0, ..., yn−1 and inputs
u0, ..., un−1. The observability depends only on matrices A
and C since a necessary and sufficient condition for a system
to be observable is that the observability matrix O(A,C) has
n linearly independent rows.
rank O(A,C) = rank

C
CA
...
CAn−1
 = n (10)
As mentioned previously, there are four components in
the attack surface that may be attacked: sensors, actuators,
controllers, and network traffic. For this reason, the generated
models should address the vulnerabilities exploited in one
or more of these components. The resilience design of a
CPS can be characterized by the actuator resilience RA,
the sensor resilience RS , the control resilience RC , and the
communication resilience RN .
Definition 3 (Actuator Resilience RA): A CPS is t-actuator
resilient if rank C(A,BΓ) = n, i.e. the system is controllable
for all possible subset Γ, where Γ is the set of all possible
combinations of actuators removing t critical compromised
actuators.
Definition 4 (Sensor Resilience RS): A CPS is t-sensor
resilient if rank O(A,C∆) = n, i.e. the system is observable
for all the subsets in ∆, where ∆ is the set of all possible
combinations of sensor removing t critical compromised sen-
sors.
This means that the system will be resilient if the controller
can take action despite the compromised parts of the system.
The definition of the matrices BΓ and C∆ depends on the
particular resilience strategy applied to improve the actuator
or the sensor resilience.
Definition 5 (Control Resilience RC): A CPS is t-control
resilient if rank C(A,BΛ) = n and rank O(A,CΛ) = n,
i.e, the system is controllable and observable for all possible
subset in Λ which is obtained by removing t possible com-
promised critical controllers.
This definition means that if t-critical-controllers are
compromised, the system can keep working and recover the
state to an equilibrium point without these controllers working.
Definition 6 (Communication Resilience RN ): A CPS
is t-communication resilient if rank C(A,BΓ) = n and
rank O(A,CΓ) = n, i.e, the system is controllable
and observable for all possible subset in Γ removing t
compromised network links in which the adversary has the
ability to recover the system model from collected data.
Next, we review different strategies that allow to improve
the resilience of a CPS in each of its dimensions. We start
from a minimum CPS with no resilience and progressively
increase it with different techniques.
The minimal possible configuration is a CPS with the min-
imum amount of actuators and sensors to work, an automated
controller capable of correcting errors in the process, and a
non-redundant network that provides connectivity. This basic
system provides observability and controllability in order to
ensure fault correction. However, it is not resilient to attacks.
To achieve a resilient CPS is required to improve the system
design including, for example, techniques as the following
ones.
The actuators resilience RA can be improved by adding
diversified actuators to perform the control actions over the
system. Another proposal to improve the actuator resilience is
presented in [18] which provides a resilient approach based
on moving target defense techniques that use this principle to
protect CPSs from actuator and sensor attacks. In addition, in
[9], authors define a decoder that can also correct attacks in
actuators or sensors that have been corrupted. The strategies
to improve actuator resilience require to add extra hardware
devices that help to compensate for the incorrect function of
the affected ones.
The sensor resilience RS can be improved using different
techniques. Firstly, in a similar way as the previous case, it
is possible to add a diversified sensor. In addition, sensor
resilience can be improved using software approaches that do
not require to add extra hardware devices. For example, the
techniques proposed in [12], [5], [6] and [25] provide resilient
state estimation and reconstruction in the presence of integrity
attacks.
Another software approach to improve the sensor resilience
is to use an auxiliary system with Luenberger observers [30].
The controller resilience RC can be improved by adding
local capabilities in the devices, for example, a smart actuator
with an embedded local controller that can take control de-
cisions outside the domain of the adversary. Another option
is to implement distributed controllers that implement voting
techniques to reach consensus to avoid malicious nodes. This
problem has been studied extensively in distributed computing
[20] [10]. Also, techniques such as secret sharing [32] [3] [2]
and distributed trust [1] [14] may be used to implement, for
example, mechanisms that divide the control into shares, such
that the system needs to reach a given threshold prior granting
control. Below the threshold, the information gets concealed
from the eyes of the adversary.
The communication resilience RN can be addressed as
a problem of transmitting information in the presence of
misbehaving nodes has been widely studied in communication
networks [13] [21]. To improve the network resilience one
possibility is to add redundant physical or virtual independent
networks. Other mechanisms such as [34] showed that linear
iterative strategies are able to achieve the minimum bound
required to disseminate information reliably, so malicious
nodes will be unable to prevent from calculating any function
(under a broadcast model of communication). Finally, in [31],
it is proposed a dynamic mechanism that dynamically create
auxiliary controllers that help the switches to sanitize the
traffic modified by the adversary in the network exchange.
V. EXPERIMENTAL WORK – NUMERIC SIMULATION
In this section, we analyze whether a system is resilient
using the proposed metrics. To validate the approach, we es-
timate the defined metrics using a Matlab numeric simulation
with a simplified version of the Tennesse Eastman (TE) control
challenge problem [26]. The physical process consists of an
isothermal reactor with a separation system. In it occurs an
irreversible reaction where the reactants A and C generate
the product D. The reaction rate depends only on the partial
pressures of A and C.
Manipulated Variables: The control objective is to maintain
the product flow rate at a specified value by manipulating the
flows of two feeds steams, one purge stream, and the liquid
holdup volume.
The two controlled feeds to the reactor chamber are Feed
1 and Feed 2. Feed 1 (u1) consists of the reactants A and C,
and traces of an inert gas B. Feed 2 (u2) consists of pure A,
which is used to compensate for disturbances in the partial
pressures of A and C in Feed 1.
The purge rate (u3) depends on the pressure in the vessel
and the position of the purge control valve. The vapor phase
can be assumed to consist only on A, B, and C, and the liquid,
pure D.
The product flow rate (u4) is adjusted using a proportional
feedback controller which responds to variations in the liquid
inventory. The regulatory control problem is to maintain a
specified product rate by manipulating flows of streams 1, 2,
and 3.
Controlled variables: The monitored variables are the pro-
duction rate (F4), the pressure (P), the liquid inventory (VL)
and the amount of reactant A in the purge flow (yA3).
Physical Model: The system is described by the following
matrix of transfer functions.
y =

F4
P
yA3
V L
 = Gu =

g11 0 0 g14
g21 0 g23 0
0 g32 0 0
0 0 0 g44


u1
u2
u3
u4
 (11)
The individual transfer functions are given below (the unit
of s is seconds).
g11 =
0.02833
45s+ 1
g21 =
45(340s+ 1)
9000s2 + 615s+ 1
g23 =
−900s− 11.25
9000s2 + 615s+ 1
g32 =
1.5
600s+ 1
e−6s
g14 =
−3.4s
360s2 + 66s+ 1
g44 =
1
60s+ 1
A. Resilience Evaluation
The first step to evaluate the resilience of a system is to
determine the system threshold, the setpoints, and the satura-
tion limits for its variables. These parameters are determined
by the restrictions from the physical aspects of the plant. We
used the data provided in the TE problem [26]. Tables I and
II summarize the manipulated and measured variables.
The physical process objective is to maximize the produc-
tion rate while keeping a safe state.
Thresholds: The system thresholds are expressed in Table II.
In particular, the operating pressure must be kept below 3k
Pa due to safety restrictions. Otherwise, the system should be
shutdown.
Saturation limits: The limits for each actuator are in Table
I. The flow rates saturate at some point and each valve can
variate in a range of 0 to 100 % open to variate the flow rate.
Setpoints: The setpoints are in Table II. In addition, in the
column Input for SP in Table I are expressed the input
associated with those setpoints.
The thresholds are essential to evaluate whether a system
will be resilient or not. For each monitored variable with
threshold restrictions, we should evaluate if the system will
Variable Input for setpoint Description Saturation
u1 60.95327313484253 Feed 1 valve position 0–100%
u2 25.02232231706676 Feed 2 valve position 0–100%
u3 39.25777017606444 Purge valve position 0–100%
u4 44.17670682730923 Liquid inventory setpoint 0–100%
TABLE I
MANIPULATED VARIABLES [26].
Variable setpoint Description Units Threshold
F4 100.00 Product flow kmol/hr -
P 2700.00 Pressure kPa 2k - 3k
VL 44.18 Liquid inventory % 0 – 100
yA3 47.00 Amount of A in purge mol % 0 – 100
TABLE II
CONTROLLED VARIABLES [26].
Valve Saturation
Scenario # 1 # 2 # 3
u1 100% 85% 70%
u3 0% 5% 12.5%
TABLE III
MALICIOUS SATURATION LEVEL SCENARIOS TO EXCEED THE SYSTEM
MAXIMUM PRESSURE.
meet them or not considering the worst case adversary sce-
nario. In this experimental work, we present the evaluation
considering only the system pressure as the monitored vari-
able. However, the process should be also repeated for the
other variables.
Performance and Stability Metrics: For the evaluation, we
consider the resilience approach explained in Appendix A and
we want to measure how much this approach improves the
resilience by calculating the defined metrics. To be resilient the
system has to remain within the threshold for any adversarial
input. In the case of the system pressure, we have a minimum
and maximum threshold.
In this experimental work, we will consider two adversaries
that want to exploit the pressure threshold. The first adversary
makes the system exceed the maximum value and the second
one the minimum. The configuration parameters for these
adversaries are detailed in Tables III and IV respectively. The
scenarios use different saturation levels to represent adver-
saries’ aggressiveness level in the adversary model.
As showed in Equation (cf. 11), the pressure can be obtained
as P = g21.u1+g23.u3. Hence, it depends on command inputs
u1 and u3. In addition, g21 has a positive sign, so, if we
increase u1, we will increase the pressure. On the contrary,
g23 has a negative sign, so we need to decrease u3 value to
increase the pressure.
Figures 1(a) and 1(c) compares the behavior of the system
with the resilience approach facing both adversaries. In addi-
Valve Saturation
Scenario # 1 # 2 # 3
u1 0% 20% 30%
u3 100% 75% 50%
TABLE IV
MALICIOUS SATURATION LEVEL SCENARIOS TO EXCEED THE SYSTEM
MINIMUM PRESSURE.
Performance & Stability
Scenario KA KR MD RL PR
# 1 30 126 182 13640 99.93%
# 2 30 53 115 4517 99.98%
# 3 30 0 44 442 100%
Resilience Estimation 30 1623 188 128240 99.80%
TABLE V
RESILIENCE EVALUATION FOR TENNESSE EASTMAN PROBLEM.
SCENARIOS DESCRIBED IN TABLE III.
Performance & Stability
Scenario KA KR MD RL PR
# 1 30 491 293 66327 99.68%
# 2 30 405 196 45900 99.78%
# 3 30 339 143 34050 99.83%
Resilience Estimation 30 1623 302 277910 98.72%
TABLE VI
RESILIENCE EVALUATION FOR TENNESSE EASTMAN PROBLEM.
SCENARIOS DESCRIBED IN TABLE IV.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1. (a) Resilient response vs normal case and attack without resilience for an adversary exploiting the maximum pressure threshold, (b) Resilience
estimation using the proposed metrics vs. Monte Carlo simulation for adversaries in Table III, (c) Resilient response vs normal case and attack without
resilience for an adversary exploiting the minimum pressure threshold, (d) Resilience estimation using the proposed metrics vs. Monte Carlo simulation for
adversaries in Table IV.
tion, it compares this response with the normal case behavior
without attack and the attack case without resilience.
To evaluate the resilience, we used the metrics defined
in Section IV-A and we compare the behaviors against the
defined threshold. The results for the maximum and minimum
pressure threshold are showed in Tables V and VI respectively.
The estimated resilience is obtained with the proposed met-
rics and it shows how the system will react during the absorb
and recovery phase considering the worst case adversary.
We can observe also that all the adversaries scenarios are
included withing the resilience estimation and more aggressive
adversaries, such as scenario #1, produce a bigger decrease
in resilience than a less aggressive such as scenario #3. We
can observe this in Figures 1(b) and 1(d) that compare the es-
timated resilience with experimental Monte Carlo simulations
for the scenarios in Tables III and IV respectively.
Design and Structure Resilience: Thereinafter, we discuss
how to incrementally design a resilient TE system.
Design 1: The most basic design is a system with no auto-
mated controller feeding inputs to actuators. It is controlled,
for example, manually by an operator or the actuators operate
in a fixed way.
Design 2: Another option to create a basic design is a
system that has no sensors and it works at open loop since the
controller is not getting feedback from the physical process.
Designs 1 and 2 are not resilient to attacks. They are even
not capable of correcting system failures because there is no
controllability and no observability. For this reason, the metrics
RA, RS , RC and RN are all zero.
Design 3: The previous design can be improved by provid-
ing basic observability and controllability with an automated
controller capable of correcting errors in the process, non-
redundant actuators, sensors and network.
This design is better that the previous ones because it
ensures fault correction, i.e, it is capable of correcting non-
malicious errors in the physical process. However, this design
is still not resilient to attacks and the metrics RA, RS , RC
and RN are all zero.
To improve the resilience, it is required to contemplate
mechanisms to face the compromise of sensors, actuators,
controllers or network links. If a system has more capabilities
to restore the critical components than other system, then its
more resilient. In the sequel, we provide examples to do this.
These metrics do not represent the system security. Instead, a
better resilience measure indicates that the system will react in
a stable manner, recover with less effort and with less damage
after an attack.
Design 4: We can improve Design 3 by adding a resilience
approach such as the one in Appendix A. This way, RN is
increased in one.
Design 5 and 6: Adding diversified sensors and actuators it
is possible to improve RS and RA respectively. For example,
in a system with 4 actuators, it will be 2-actuator resilient if
the system after removing any combination of 2 actuators has
still the ability to find a control input that can take the system
to an equilibrium state. This means that if the set Γ which
contains any combination of two not compromised actuators,
i.e. {(a1, a2), (a1, a3), (a1, a4), (a2, a3), (a2, a4), (a3, a4)}
will be 2-RA if all the systems defined for this set Γ are
controllable, i.e., (A,B(a1,a2)), (A,B(a1,a3)), (A,B(a1,a4)),
(A,B(a2,a3)), (A,B(a2,a3)) and (A,B(a3,a4)) are all control-
lable.
Design 7: We can improve RC changing the valves for smart
valves with an embedded controller integrated in the device.
This option increases the resilience by adding redundant
control outside the attacker domain, for example as in [29].
This will increase metric RC in one unit.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented metrics to evaluate the resilience of a
proposed approach. The proposed metrics are based on control
theory performance and stability concepts; and on the design
and structure of the system. A system with a better resilience
indicates that the system will react in a stable manner, recover
with less effort and with less damage after an attack. We
evaluated the proposed metric using the Tennesse Eastman
problem as a case study and we demonstrate the capabilities
of the metrics to provide an upper bound for the worst case
damage that an adversary may cause. The metrics also provide
a mechanism to compare the resilience achieved by a particular
approach or a whole system design, giving tools to evaluate
during the system conception the best techniques to create a
resilient design.
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APPENDIX
The resilience approach takes as an input a CPS modeled
by a transfer function and builds a resilient equivalent system
capable of controlling the same physical process using a
Switched Linear Control System. A switched system consists
of a finite number of subsystems and a logical rule that
orchestrates the switching between the subsystems. It may be
modeled as follows:
xk+1 = fσ(k)(xk, uk) (12)
where k ∈ Z+ is the time interval, x ∈ Rn is the state,
u ∈ Rp is the control input and σ is the logical rule that or-
chestrates the switching between the subsystems. It means that
σ is a function σ : Z+ → I, where I = {1, ..., N} contains
the indexes of the subsystems. A subsystem is determined by
a pair (Mi, Gi) where Mi = {Ai, Bi, Ci : i ∈ I} is the
set of physical system models and Gi = {Vi, Ei : i ∈ I} is
the set of graphs that represent the network connections in the
CPS. Hence, σ define a piece-wise switching signal that is a
time-varying definition of the process model and the network
graph that is activated at time k. The physical model activated
at time k is then defined by Equation (13) as follows:
xk+1 = Aσ(k)xk +Bσ(k)uk
yk = Cσ(k)xk
(13)
whose system communicates through a network determined by
the connectivity graph Gσ(k) = [Vσ(k), Eσ(k)]. The approach
aims at protecting the system from network adversaries work-
ing at the node level by modifying the controller model and at
the network layers modifying the endpoint information. In the
sequel, we describe the procedure to build the resilient system.
Step 1 (Models Design): The first step to build the system is to
design the physical models, i.e., create the subset of matrices
Mi = {Ai, Bi, Ci : i ∈ I} that will be activated at each
time period. The approach we propose is to design distributed
controllers that modify in time the physical model they exe-
cute. The overall process is controlled by several independent
controllers and altogether represent a decentralized controller,
i.e., if at time k it is activated the control model with matrices
Ai, Bi, Ci then there will be j controllers with j ∈ 1...o and
each controller will use a set of matrices Aij , Bij , Cij where
Ai =
o⋃
j=1
Aij , Bi =
o⋃
j=1
Bij and Ci =
o⋃
j=1
Cij . Hence, the
controllers have available only parts of the overall information.
In the sequel, we describe how to derive the equivalent
models starting from the initial transfer G(s). The objective is
to obtain different models expressed in a state-space model
with the Aij , Bij , Cij matrices which can be combined to
represent the system dynamics as in Equations 1 and 2 and
it allows deriving different sets of controllers capable of
controlling the physical process.
Step 1.1: To obtain the equivalent representation we will
factorize the matrices applying techniques similar to the ones
used by the different approaches for decentralized control
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 2. Decentralized models (a) via serial decomposition (b) or parallel
decomposition (c).
design [23] [35]. It consists in combining a diagonal controller
Q(s) with a block compensator D(s) in such a way that the
controller perceives the process dynamics G(s) as a set of
independent processes as showed in Equation (14):
G(s) ·D(s) = Q(s) (14)
where D(s) and Q(s) are both n × n matrices of transfer
functions and Q(s) is diagonal. Hence, the structure of the
distributed controllers will be formed for n controllers execut-
ing the Qii transfer functions and each of these controllers
is connected with n controllers executing the Dij transfer
function. In Figure 2(a), we show the structure for a 2 × 2
example.
To create this distributed design, the first step is to calculate
adjG(s) the adjudged matrix of G which is the transposition
of the co-factor matrix of G.
Step 1.2: We build matrix D(s) as follows. For each column
Jˆ = {1, .., N}, we select a row Iˆ to set that element dIˆJˆ in
the matrix D(s) to unity. It is necessary to choose one for
each column but not necessarily the diagonal ones.
After choosing the elements (Iˆ , Jˆ) to be set to one, the
matrix D(s) can be completed as follows:
diJˆ =
adjGiJˆ
adjGIˆJˆ
where adjGij is the (i, j) element of adjG(s) the adjugate
matrix of G.
This process is repeated by selecting different rows Iˆ in
order to obtain different distributed models. Hence, for a n×n
process, there are nn possible choices of D(s) since it depends
on the possible positions to place the 1s values when building
matrix D(s). However, some of those choices can result in
non-realizable systems. For example, if the adjudged matrix
has a zero value in that entry. Thus, the configuration can be
selected depending on the realizability.
Step 1.3: Q(s) is a diagonal matrix built using Equation (14)
and multiplying G(s) · D(s). Each matrix D(s) gives, as a
result, a different matrix Q(s).
Step 1.4: Due to realizability restrictions, it is possible to have
matrices D with many elements equal to 0, which reduces
the number of possible generated models. In this case, it is
possible to generate other equivalent models using transfer
function decomposition techniques.
Step 1.4.1 (Serial Decomposition): A transfer function G(s)
may be decomposed in transfer functions that multiply to-
gether as showed in Figure 2 (b). Hence, G(s) = G1(s).G2(s).
This decomposition is commutative and it is possible to
generate combinations of the different factors to create the
distributed transfer functions. This can be applied at the level
of transfer functions as well as factoring the original transfer
function in its poles and zeros representation as follows:
G(s) = k
N∏
i=1
s− zi
s− pi (15)
where the denominator coefficients pi are the poles, the
numerator zi are the zeros of the transfer function and k
is the gain term. This mechanism allows generating different
partitions of matrices Q(s) and D(s).
Step 1.4.2 (Parallel Decomposition): In this case, the transfer
function G(s) is decomposed into a sum of terms as showed
in Figure 2 (c). Hence, G(s) = G1(s) + G2(s). This can be
done with a technique called partial fraction decomposition
that finds the residues and poles. The terms are as follows:
G(s) = k +
N∑
i=1
ri
s− pi (16)
where the denominator coefficients pi are called the poles of
the transfer function, the numerator ri is the residue of pole pi
and k is a constant. Hence, after applying this technique to a
dij transfer function, we will obtain a family of dtij functions
that can be added to obtain the original dij function.
This mechanism allows generating a different distribution
of compensators matrices D(s).
Step 1.5: After calculating the sets of matrices D(s) and Q(s),
it is possible to take each dij and qij entry to calculate its
corresponding matrices A, B and C using the procedure to
transform a transfer function into a state space model.
Step 2 (Network Design): In this section, we analyze how to
design the network connectivity graph G = [V,E] for each of
the physical models created in Step 1.
Step 2.1: The transfer functions in Q(s) are controllers that
take one input and send one output. Each of them will be
executed in one node. For notation, if a node vq executes the
controller qii then we will call it vqii .
The dij and dtij elements take the output of the qjj element
to make their calculations and produce an output control
signal. Each dij will be executed in one node vd and the
notation will be vdij to express that the node vd executes the
transfer function dij . s The network contains also a set of
sensor nodes vs and a set of actuator nodes va. If the sensor
measures the variables of Gij , then the notation will be vsi .
In a similar way, vaj represents the actuator that applies the
control input j.
Hence, the set of nodes V in the graph G contains the nodes
vq , vd, vs and va. In the system, there are also network devices,
such as routers and switches. However, we are not explicitly
including them in the design as we assume a traditional use
of them.
Step 2.2: The set of edges E will be defined from the matrices
D(s) and Q(s) according to the following four main rules: (1)
(vqjj , vdij ) ∈ E; (2) (vdij , vai) ∈ E; (3) (vdtij , vai) ∈ E; (4)
(vsi , vqii) ∈ E. An example can be observed in Figure 2(a)
where according to the rule (1) the component q11 is connected
to d11 and d21. In addition, the output of q22 should be sent to
d12 and d22. Due to rule (2), the output of components d11 and
d21 are combined to create the command u1 that should be
received by actuator a1. In a similar manner, it is created the
command for actuator a2. Rule (3) is the equivalent to rule (2)
when parallel decomposition is applied. In this particular case,
it does not apply. Finally, rule (4) indicates that the sensor s1
and s2 measure the data that should be sent to components
q11 and q22 respectively.
Step 2.3: To coordinate the system, there will be an orchestra-
tor, physically located in the SDN controller. The orchestrator
has the following responsibilities.
1) Choose a key for the model selection. There are
I = {1, ..., N} possible subsystems to activate and the
orchestrator chooses in a random manner a key K1 which
will be used to select the next model to activate using a
hash function as follows hash(K1, j) mod N where j is
the switching interval. The common sharing of K1, j and
N allows each device to compute the next active model
in a distributed manner. The key is renewed periodically
using one of the existing approaches for key generation
and distribution such as [19].
2) Coordinate the network configuration transformation.
Each component will change its network configuration in
each switching period of the physical model. To do this,
each device gets a real IP address (RIPA) and a virtual
IP address (VIPA). The RIPA is used for management
purposes making the network configuration transforma-
tion transparent to administrators. The VIPA is used to
communicate the data packets of the CPS, i.e., the hosts
communicate with another host using their VIPAs. In
addition, VIPAs change periodically and synchronously
in a distributed fashion over time. In every transformation
interval, the hosts will be associated with a unique VIPA.
The VIPA transformation is managed by the SDN devices
by selecting an address from the unused address space.
Each host will be allocated an IP address ranges to choose
the VIPAs and they are selected using a hash function
from the designated ranges. Since the VIPAs are chosen
from the assigned network sub-nets, there is no need to
do a routing update advertisement for internal routers.
In addition, SDN devices will forward packets from old
connections until the session is terminated or expired.
Each SDN device is responsible for the management of
the hosts in one or more sub-nets. The VIPAs selection is
done in a similar way to the physical model selection. It
uses a hash function and a secret random key to guarantee
unpredictability. If there are p available VIPAs for a host,
then the SDN device can compute the index of the VIPA
for the switching interval j as hash(K2, j) mod p. The
SDN controller is responsible for the management of the
SDN devices and the key K2 distribution.
3) Coordinate the transformation time. The orchestrator
has to choose and coordinate the switching in a master-
slave mode. It requires a distributed timing synchro-
nization that ensures the achievement and maintenance
of a common time for all the nodes of the network.
Many proposals have already work in solving this type
of issues [33].
Step 3 (Switching Function Design): Finally, it is required
to design the switching function σ which indicates when to
change the activated subsystem. It can be demonstrated that
from the physical point of view, it is possible to use an unre-
stricted switching signal, this means that there is no minimum
switching time required since the proposed subsystem share a
Common Quadratic Lyapunov function by design. Hence, this
ensures the stability of the proposed switched linear system.
However, in this type of system, the physical part is coupled
with the cyber components and for this reason, the switching
must be done considering the correct behavior of the cyber
layer, for example, a switching time that allows the network
devices to update correctly the routing tables.
